Game Theory-Based Defense Strategies Against Coordinated Attacks on Multi-State Interdependent Critical Infrastructures

Critical Infrastructures (CIs) delivering essential services, like energy and water, share vulnerabilities through their interdependences of many kinds, including physical, operational and others. These interdependences generate systems of systems exposed to coordinated attacks that can lead to cascading failures across the infrastructures. This work presents an attack-defense game model to determine optimal defense strategies for multi-state interdependent CIs. The model combines game theory and network theory to assess the topological and operational features of the interdependent infrastructures considered. To estimate the operational impact of disruptions on the CIs, inoperability assessments are developed and critical nodes are identified based on their topological importance in the system of systems. The model considers the risk attitude of both attackers and defenders by evaluating their respective game payoffs with Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). A case study regarding a system of systems made of a power grid and a water network is used to illustrate the application of the proposed model.

Keywords: Critical infrastructures, Interdependencies, Multiple states, Inoperability, Coordinated attacks, Attack-defense game, Cumulative prospect theory.