Proceedings of the
The Nineteenth International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS 2023)
December 1 – 4, 2023, Haikou, China
Research on Supply Chain Carbon Emission Reduction Cooperation Under Consumers' Low-Carbon Preference and Government Subsidy Policy
1School of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University, China.
2Zhejiang Thermal Power Construction Co., Ltd, China Energy Construction Group, China.
3Zengsheng Town Central Primary School, China.
ABSTRACT
To help supply chain enterprises affected by government subsidies and consumers' low-carbon preference to actively produce low-carbon products and increase the market capacity of low-carbon products, it is necessary to establish an effective cooperation method between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain. Therefore, based on government subsidy policies and consumers' low-carbon preference, this paper constructs the Stackelberg game model to explore the optimal carbon emission reduction (CER) strategy combination of supply chain members without cooperation and emission reduction promotion cooperation. We analyze the influence of consumers' low-carbon preference and government subsidies on supply chain CER and further explore the impact of cooperation among members on supply chain performance and the environment. The results show that whether cooperation or not, the increase in consumers' low-carbon preference and subsidies positively affect supply chain CER. When consumers' low-carbon preference is low, the total CER under the cooperation of emission reduction promotion is greater than that without cooperation. When consumers' low-carbon preference is high, the total CER is lower when cooperation exists. In addition, cooperation can improve the optimal pricing of supply chain members and the overall profit of the supply chain. However, whether manufacturers and retailers cooperate is related to consumers' low-carbon preference.
Keywords: Government subsidy, carbon emission reduction, consumers' low-carbon preference, pricing, cooperation, supply chain.
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1School of Economics and Management, China Jiliang University, China.
2Zhejiang Thermal Power Construction Co., Ltd, China Energy Construction Group, China.
3Zengsheng Town Central Primary School, China.
ABSTRACT
To help supply chain enterprises affected by government subsidies and consumers' low-carbon preference to actively produce low-carbon products and increase the market capacity of low-carbon products, it is necessary to establish an effective cooperation method between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain. Therefore, based on government subsidy policies and consumers' low-carbon preference, this paper constructs the Stackelberg game model to explore the optimal carbon emission reduction (CER) strategy combination of supply chain members without cooperation and emission reduction promotion cooperation. We analyze the influence of consumers' low-carbon preference and government subsidies on supply chain CER and further explore the impact of cooperation among members on supply chain performance and the environment. The results show that whether cooperation or not, the increase in consumers' low-carbon preference and subsidies positively affect supply chain CER. When consumers' low-carbon preference is low, the total CER under the cooperation of emission reduction promotion is greater than that without cooperation. When consumers' low-carbon preference is high, the total CER is lower when cooperation exists. In addition, cooperation can improve the optimal pricing of supply chain members and the overall profit of the supply chain. However, whether manufacturers and retailers cooperate is related to consumers' low-carbon preference.
Keywords: Government subsidy, carbon emission reduction, consumers' low-carbon preference, pricing, cooperation, supply chain.
Download PDF