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<doi>10.3850/S201046932012000111</doi>
<article-title>From Dichotomous to Relational Thinking in the Psychology of Creativity: A Review of Great Debates</article-title>
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<author>Vlad Petre Gl&#462;veanu</author>
<author-citation>Gl&#462;veanu, Vlad Petre</author-citation>

<aff>Department of Communication and Psychology, Aalborg University, Kroghstraede 3, Aalborg, Denmark.</aff>

<email><a href="mailto:vlad@id.aau.dk">vlad@id.aau.dk</a></email>


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<title>ABSTRACT</title>
<p>This article invites us to think about the role of dichotomies in the psychology of creativity
and how they can sometimes lead to a misrepresentation of the phenomenon. Especially
when turned into oppositions, which is often the case with dichotomies, distinctions such as
those between individual and society, Big C and little c creativity, evolutionary and revolutionary
creation, domain generality and domain specificity, product and process, can have
detrimental effects on our understanding of the nature and characteristics of creative expression.
In contrast, the article advocates for a relational type of logic, supported by
socio-cultural and pragmatist sources, one that encourages us to observe the interdependence
between categories and the ways in which they are embedded into each other.
Examples are given from the five &#8220;debates&#8221; mentioned above and some consequences of
adopting a new way of thinking about creativity discussed towards the end. </p><p><italic>Keywords: </italic>Creativity, Dichotomous logic, Relational logic, Categories, Great debates.</p>
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