



Out of Necessity: ASEAN's Measures Regarding Disaster Relief in the 21st Century

Steven Keithley*

*School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 3700 O Street NW
Washington, DC 20057, USA
E-mail: smk79@georgetown.edu*

Southeast Asia has always been a hotspot for catastrophic natural disasters. Despite that history, instead of being proactive in implementing disaster relief measures, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been reactive, only making changes after major disasters have forced such decisions. This paper analyzes how the organization has responded to the most significant regional natural disasters since ASEAN's first notable disaster relief policy was implemented in 2003: the Boxing Day Tsunami and Cyclone Nargis. Through a discussion of these events and the reaction of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, this paper argues that ASEAN's disaster relief apparatus has, unfortunately, only been expanded when new disasters demonstrated certain weaknesses, and thus, ASEAN still has much room for growth in the realm of disaster management.

Keywords: ASEAN, Disaster Relief, 21st Century, Boxing Day Tsunami, Cyclone Nargis, Reactive, Southeast Asia, Policy.

This article focuses upon the measures that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has taken to address issues of natural disaster relief since 2003, a topic that has received little attention from scholars but deserves much more. Given Southeast Asia's history of frequent and severe cyclones, earthquakes and other disasters, as well as the fact that "scientific predictions and evidence indicates that global climate change will increase the number of extreme events," disaster management will only become more significant to the region's most substantial international organization. Thus, in anticipation of a future where relief efforts will consume an increasingly significant portion of the agenda for meetings between member states, this article attempts to provide the background and an assessment of ASEAN's work on disaster management.¹ The overall aim of this article is to

*The author spends his time between Washington, DC and Hong Kong so please direct all correspondence to the email address listed.

show that, despite attempts to create a credible framework for disaster relief in the early years of the 21st century, it was only due to horrific natural disasters experienced in first decade of the new millennia that ASEAN was able to establish a substantial disaster relief program. The scope is the past ten years of ASEAN's history - from 2003, when the first substantive attempt at creating a disaster relief apparatus was undertaken, to 2013 - and the impact upon, and response of ASEAN, to two particular types of natural disasters: earthquakes and tropical cyclones.

Accordingly, this article will comprise five sections. The first, the Introduction, will provide background information on ASEAN and its track record on natural disaster relief from its beginning in 1967 until 2003, when, as mentioned earlier, the first concrete action was taken to address the problem. The second section will begin with a chronological examination of ASEAN's efforts at disaster relief since 2003, starting with the creation of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management in early 2003, and ending just before the incredibly tragic Boxing Day Tsunami in December 2004. The third section will discuss ASEAN's response to the aforementioned Tsunami, and the ensuing criticism from the international community which provided most of the aid. This section will also detail further steps taken to strengthen ASEAN cooperation on natural disaster relief from 2005 until 2008. The fourth section will deal with Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN's response, which received more positive international attention. This section will also include the subsequent steps that the organization has taken since then to improve its disaster relief programs, but which are still insufficient. The fifth section, the Conclusion, will evaluate the current state of ASEAN's mechanisms for relief, and offer three concrete policy recommendations to improve ASEAN's efforts providing relief in a future where extreme natural calamities will be not only more severe than present, but also far more common.

1. Introduction: Background Information on ASEAN & Disaster Management from 1967 to 2003

To properly understand the nature and effectiveness of ASEAN's current protocols for natural disasters, it is necessary to survey the history of the organization's programs on this matter, because, throughout the 20th century, the internal structure of ASEAN was so decentralized that it could not deal properly with the problem of natural disasters.

ASEAN was founded on August 8th, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with five members: Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. The organization was founded explicitly for economic and sociocultural reasons, but also for implicit regional security concerns. Despite Indonesia having experienced an earthquake of 7.6 on the Richter scale that killed 71 people and destroyed thousands of buildings just two years earlier, there was no mention of disaster relief in the Bangkok Declaration that laid out the goals and purposes of

ASEAN. However, in 1971, the organization created the ASEAN Experts Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM), made up of politicians, scientists and other "expert[s] from around the region gathered together] to explore the possibility of establishing an ASEAN combined operation against natural disasters."² This marked the first time ASEAN addressed the problem of natural disasters. Yet, the AEGDM was only initially authorized to "explore the possibility" of creating a more powerful sub-body to deal with disaster relief, rather than to provide any aid.³ ASEAN still did not discuss disaster relief in any of its landmark accords, thus negating any sense of progress that the organization had achieved earlier with the AEGDM.

In fact, it would not be until nine years after its foundation that ASEAN mentioned disaster management in one of its major agreements, finally recognizing the frequent earthquakes and cyclones sweeping through the region. This acknowledgement was found in the Bali Concord, signed by the five members of ASEAN on February 24th, 1976. In the Bali Concord, they agreed that ASEAN members should "extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress," based upon the recognition that "[n]atural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states."⁴ Unfortunately, this was still just one small part of a much longer declaration, and ended up being overshadowed by the plans for significant economic integration also contained within the Bali Concord. In other words, ASEAN members may have made a broad commitment to mutual aid and support during natural disasters, but considering that the Bali Concord did not elaborate any further, there were no instructions on just how to actualize such reciprocity.

Fortunately, that would soon follow. Five months later, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed the Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters in Manila on June 26th, 1976. Not only did this agreement reiterate the broad claim made in Bali that there is "an urgent need for mutual assistance in the mitigation of the effects of natural disasters," but it actually attempted to create a framework for doing so.⁵ It asked the ASEAN states to increase the exchange of information, specialists, medical supplies and other relevant items and personnel in the aftermath of natural disasters through internal governmental organizations.⁶ However, this framework was limited because it still did not elevate the role of the ASEAN Experts Group.

The weakness of this framework was evident in the response to the Moro Gulf Earthquake and Tsunami, which struck the Philippines on August 16th, 1976. Even with the Bali Concord and the Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters on the books, ASEAN member states still did not make a sizeable, unified effort to aid the Philippines. Instead, Manila looked elsewhere for monetary and other aid to provide relief for what their then-President called the "worst disaster in our nation's history, except [for] the Second World War."⁷ Hence, the Philippine recovery was largely financed by the United States rather than by ASEAN. Soon after the disaster, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution "expressing full support for U.S. aid in the relief and rehabilitation of... the Philippines."

The Philippines also received aid from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which “promised approximately one million dollars for a relief of victims of the earthquake,” and kept its word.⁸ It is important to point out that contemporary journal and newspaper articles failed to mention the contribution of any ASEAN nation to relief efforts following the Moro Gulf Earthquake and Tsunami, while they frequently referenced efforts of the United States and the NAM to provide financial and material support to the government in Manila.

In the years after 1976, further actions were taken to develop ASEAN’s disaster management apparatus, but nearly all failed. For instance, in 1979 and 1992, the role of AEGDM was “elevated” to try to increase cooperation on disaster relief but, this promotion in theory did not work in practice.⁹ This was because the group was supposed to meet once every two years to provide guidance, issue recommendations and fulfill other duties, but the AEGDM often failed to meet even every two years and barely played any role in the recovery and rehabilitation of nations reeling from various natural disasters.¹⁰ In fact, between 1983 and 1989, the AEGDM did not even meet. No reasons are explicitly given, but perhaps this is due to a lack of adequate leadership. This is hardly surprising since non-intervention and the avoidance of any policies that “might cut into the independence of member countries” have been central philosophies of ASEAN from its beginning.¹¹ As an inspection of relief efforts in member states during the last two decades of the 20th century illustrates, the “immediate internal arrangements to facilitate the transit through their respective territories, of vessels, aircraft, authorized personnel, supplies and equipment bound for the territory of a distressed Member Country,” supposedly guaranteed by the 1976 agreement, never materialized.¹² In fact, in the records available, ASEAN member states are either at the bottom in terms of their contribution to relief, or off the list entirely.

Two examples that demonstrate this are the recovery efforts following the earthquake that struck Indonesia in December 1992, and Typhoon Linda, which swept through Vietnam in November 1997. Both caused thousands of fatalities and millions of dollars of damage in ASEAN nations, yet, their relief efforts received little aid from other member states. In the first case, the earthquake that rocked Indonesia in December 1992 measured 7.8 on the Richter scale and caused 2,500 fatalities, constituting a catastrophe by any measure.¹³ Given the aforementioned pledges by ASEAN regarding natural disasters, it would have been expected that the organization would support Indonesia during its recovery. Yet, according to the United Nations (UN) Department of Humanitarian Affairs, with the exception of Singapore, no ASEAN member contributed to the relief effort.¹⁴ Instead, the European Economic Community (present-day European Union), Japan, the Netherlands, Australia, and Italy comprised the top five donors to Indonesia after the 1992 earthquake. In the second case, in November 1997, Typhoon Linda made landfall in Vietnam and caused the deaths of 3,111 people, inflicting over USD \$300 million in damages.¹⁵ According to the UN, despite the fact that Vietnam “issued an appeal

for international assistance on 8 November 1997," none of its fellow ASEAN states played a role in the relief effort.¹⁶ Just like in Indonesia, Western nations provided the bulk of donations to Vietnam, with the United States, Russia, Switzerland and France as the top four contributors. Not even Singapore, the most industrialized state within ASEAN, and the only one that had sent aid to Indonesia in 1992, donated to Vietnam.

This, along with the other aforementioned cases of disaster relief measures, shows a breakdown in intra-ASEAN cooperation, and a failure of the translation from principle into practice of bodies like the AEGDM throughout the 20th century. The organization was plagued by its "normative framework," which did not "provide a way of responding to non-traditional threats posed by natural disasters."¹⁷ From the earthquake in the Moro Gulf in 1976 to the typhoon in Vietnam in 1997, ASEAN's official responses to natural disasters affecting its member states were often far from adequate. Each example mentioned above is similar in that regard. The organization may have recognized the severity of these calamities through its accords and the 'working groups' it created, but the Association did little provide real, tangible relief. Perhaps because of these disappointments, ASEAN turned a page and began a serious reconsideration and revision of its disaster relief policy in the 21st century.

2. ASEAN's Concerted Efforts in the 21st Century: New Relief Frameworks

After suffering through twenty-five years of insufficient ASEAN cooperation on disaster, the organization took concrete steps towards the establishment of a more effective disaster relief mechanism in 2003. That year, ASEAN created the Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), made up of top leaders within the respective national disaster management agencies of member states. There is a general consensus amongst scholars of ASEAN that the ACDM was the first substantial action taken to realize the goals of the 1976 Bali Concord and the Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters. For instance, an 'expert' with the AEGDM, a former Director of External Relations with the ASEAN Secretariat, concluded in separate journal articles that the "good intent and principles" of responding to natural disasters that had been drafted in 1976 were "strengthened only in 2003 by the forming of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management."¹⁸ Even the ASEAN Secretariat's official website uses identical language, stating that "[t]he institutional mechanism [for disaster relief] (in the form of experts group) has existed since the '70s but was only strengthened towards 2003 with the elevation of the experts group into a full-fledged committee."¹⁹ Clearly, the ACDM was a watershed moment in the attempt to create a viable disaster management program.

What ASEAN achieved with the ACDM was an organization that “assumes overall responsibility for coordinating and implementing” contingency plans responding to natural disasters.²⁰ Not only did the ACDM bring together top officials from across the region, but it gave force to their conclusions, as the declaration which formed the ACDM stated that “all decisions of the ACDM should be endorsed by the ASEAN states.”²¹ Early on, it became evident that the ACDM would be far more fruitful than the AEDGM in the 20th century. Not only was it *mandated* to meet on an annual basis (as opposed to the AEDGM, which was supposed to meet every two years, but often did not), the ACDM was more than an advisory body. The chairman of the committee would oversee a sizeable bureaucracy of ‘Working Groups,’ including the old AEDGM, reorganizing them in order to achieve “efficiency in the use of resources and successfully attain the expected outcomes” through an implementation of the ACDM’s policy goals.²² This was demonstrated at the first meeting of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management in December 2003, where the ACDM designed a high-profile, clear-cut framework for the rest of the decade, the ASEAN Regional Program on Disaster Management (ARPDM). The ARPDM outlined twenty-nine goals, prioritizing five of them:

- (i) Establishment of the ASEAN Response Action Plan;
- (ii) Refresher Courses/Expertise Development;
- (iii) ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network (ASEAN DISCNet), i.e. Development of ACDM Website and NDMO Websites; and Publication of ASEAN Disaster Management Information Network (ADMIN) Newsletter;
- (iv) Partnerships with Relevant Organisations and NGOs; and Mobilising Financial Support and Resources; and
- (v) ASEAN Day for Disaster Management; and Enhancing Disaster Management Public Education and Awareness Programmes.²³

Unlike the attempts by ASEAN in the 1970s and 1980s, which called for cooperation that did not materialize, the ARPDM suggested aims that could be realistically achieved.

Through the rest of 2004, ASEAN worked to meet the goals of the ARPDM, especially in the areas which received priority. Reflecting the increased attention, ASEAN began to devote itself to the goal of a more credible response mechanism, regional officials in the field of disaster management urged the ACDM in early December to further “develop a regional instrument on disaster management and emergency response.”²⁴ What this demonstrated was twofold: first, it showed the elevation of concerns about responding to natural calamities, and second, it indicated that, despite the creation of the ACDM, there was still much work to be done.

3. ASEAN's Darkest Hour in Disaster Relief: Lessons Learned from the Tsunami & New Disaster Relief Policies, 2005 - 2008

Unfortunately, another event occurred in December 2004 that proved that the ACDM had still not ushered in more effective cooperation within ASEAN. On the morning of December 26, 2004, an earthquake measuring 9.1–9.3 on the Richter Scale struck the coast of Indonesia, spawning a tsunami that magnified damage across the region, bringing death and destruction not only to Indonesia, the country closest to the epicenter, but also to the ASEAN nations of Thailand, Malaysia and Myanmar.²⁵ The Boxing Day Tsunami, as it has since become known, took an unprecedented toll on the region, causing the deaths of 227,898 people, and costing at least USD \$14 billion in economic, infrastructural and human development losses.²⁶ In the long term, it accelerated efforts towards the creation of a serious disaster management plan that had begun with the ACDM in December 2003, as part of an “unprecedented global momentum for reducing exposure to disaster risk,” but in the short term, it demonstrated weaknesses of the year-old ACDM as well as ASEAN's general efforts at coordinating a regional emergency response.²⁷

According to many accounts, including the statements of leaders from its own members, the reaction of ASEAN was unsatisfactory, despite beginning on an optimistic note. ASEAN member states met almost immediately after the disaster in an attempt to find a workable path to cooperation which would serve those affected by the earthquake and tsunami. On January 6th, 2005, the then-President of Indonesia summoned the leaders of ASEAN and relevant non-governmental organizations to Jakarta to begin the “global response in assisting the national governments cope” with the aftermath.²⁸ The agreement reached in Jakarta called for the mobilization, coordination and cooperation of ASEAN member states as well as the international community to respond to the disaster. Although this put in place what could have been a viable solution, capitalizing on the fact that some states had already provided aid, such as Singapore's immediate deployment of 700 Air Force and Civil Defence Force personnel for relief efforts and Malaysia's dispatch of the ‘Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team’ to Indonesia, it soon became evident that these actions would become statistical outliers within ASEAN's overall response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami.²⁹

The then-Deputy Premier of Malaysia phrased it best when, in front of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, he called ASEAN's disaster management plan “slow or non-existent.”³⁰ Even with the initial declaration of January 6th, 2005, some scholars have concluded that ASEAN “showed its inability to cope with a scenario such as after the tsunami” by deferring to the UN in disaster management by “[r]equest[ing] the United Nations... mobilize the international community to support the national relief.”³¹ Furthermore, despite the damage that the Boxing Day earthquake and tsunami inflicted upon four ASEAN states, aid from member states of ASEAN was dwarfed by other sources of international monetary and material relief. Of the USD \$14 billion received through “a massive media-fueled

appeal for humanitarian assistance to the tsunami victims" across the globe, including to ASEAN nations, only the governments of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Kingdom of Thailand provided an official contribution according to the Financial Tracking Service of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).³² The meager amount of those financial contributions, measured at USD \$10,000 and \$730,000 respectively, shows the failure of the ACDM to realize its goal of "[m]obilising financial support and resources," especially given that these were the only financial contributions from ASEAN member states to a relief effort that garnered billions of dollars.³³ Although the aforementioned UNOCHA report highlighted non-financial contributions 'in kind' from a greater number of ASEAN members, including Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, and the Philippines, once again, those efforts were overshadowed by commitments from the rest of the world, which is a depressing assessment of the organization's disaster management policies given the significant threat to ASEAN interests that the Boxing Day Earthquake and Tsunami constituted.³⁴ Even the then-ASEAN Secretary-General concluded that "we have not made the best use of" existing "technology and resources" in response to the disaster.³⁵ Clearly, there was a consensus among ASEAN leaders and academics that the organization could have done more in its response. This weakness "was arguably serious enough to remind ASEAN of the necessity to take some kind of joint action in the future" to achieve an effective framework to respond to natural calamities that had eluded the organization in its attempts prior to December 2004.³⁶

Due to the problems revealed by the relief process, strengthening and reorganizing disaster management mechanisms became an urgent priority. Therefore, the organization staged its first joint disaster drill in September 2005. Despite some problems, the drill, which involved over 200 personnel from all ASEAN member states, "helped... better understand what are the impediments" and fix those so as to "avoid difficulties" while coordinating dozens of teams from different nations.³⁷ This drill became an annual exercise as well, repeated in the years since 2005 at different locations across the region, from Cambodia in 2006 to West Java in 2011.³⁸ These exercises continue to improve cooperation, and enhance "ASEAN's capacity for disaster relief operations."³⁹

Beyond the regular physical manifestation of cooperation on disaster management through the aforementioned exercises, ASEAN has also strengthened its legislative agreements on the issue, keeping with the trend begun by the ACDM in 2003. At meetings of the ACDM in March and June 2005, leaders in the field of disaster management concluded that a more comprehensive and obligatory plan was needed to yield a response better than the "captivatingly insufficient" one by ASEAN to respond to the tsunami, which, though strong in theory, was weak in practice.⁴⁰ Thus, on July 26, 2005, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers from member states signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). The AADMER is unique in that it represents "an agree-

ment that binds Asian states together to address disaster risk reduction and improve their preparedness for response."⁴¹ It contains extensive provisions in areas like risk identification and monitoring, preparedness and joint emergency response, all under the umbrella of the newly-created ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA). This international body aims at "facilitating co-operation and co-ordination among the Parties," which is what ASEAN failed to do in 2005.⁴²

Although the AADMER was not approved by all ASEAN nations until 2009, it still illustrates the significant steps the organization was willing to take to establish an effective disaster relief mechanism. It was the final step on a trajectory that began following a perceived weakness in the response to one of the largest natural disasters to ever affect Southeast Asia. That aid from ASEAN states to those nations affected by the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami were vastly outnumbered by donations from the international community is symbolic of the organization's inadequacies. It was "difficult for developing countries to arrange for effective co-operation," and ASEAN suffered accordingly.⁴³ The regrets of the leaders quoted earlier in this section make that reality clear. Fortunately for those affected by this tragedy, the international community was able to provide immense relief, because ASEAN certainly could not. The organization could only watch as other sources played a "more significant role" in the relief efforts.⁴⁴ This disappointment sparked significant changes, most notably the signing of AADMER in 2006. And, as will be seen in the following section, it was partly due to these policies that there was a major difference in ASEAN's response when the next major natural disaster, Cyclone Nargis, struck Myanmar on May 2nd, 2008.

4. ASEAN's Disaster Management from Cyclone Nargis to the Present

The AADMER, though not technically in force during the Nargis recovery, would prove to be a major reason why ASEAN did not encounter much of the criticism it received in 2005 after the Boxing Day Tsunami. Instead of being "hardly ever mentioned in media reports on immediate relief efforts" as in 2005, UNOCHA even concluded that "[t]he role of ASEAN... has been critical in ensuring effective co-ordination of international assistance" to Myanmar.⁴⁵ The response to Nargis has "served as an important lesson for the organization to enhance further cooperation in disaster relief among member states," therein beginning a trend of much more effective response to natural disasters.⁴⁶

Cyclone Nargis, a category-four tropical cyclone, made landfall in Myanmar on May 2nd, 2008. It swept through southern Myanmar's Irrawaddy Delta, also known as the "granary of Myanmar," causing billions in damage and killing hundreds of thousands of people, not to mention disrupting the economy of an already fragile state.⁴⁷ ASEAN's own estimates stated that "[a]pproximately 140,000 peo-

ple were killed or unaccounted for following the Cyclone" and that "[o]ne third of the inhabitants of Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions – 2.4 million people – were affected."⁴⁸

Especially given the nature of Myanmar's government, which is well-known for its "refusal to accept foreign aid," ASEAN served as an important link between the international community and Myanmar during Nargis.⁴⁹ As an organization that not only counted Myanmar as a member, but had fostered close connections with its leaders in Naypyidaw, ASEAN "took the lead in breaking down the communication and trust barriers that were preventing the flow of aid and international relief workers into the country."⁵⁰ This contrasted with reactions to the Tsunami disaster in 2005, when ASEAN simply deferred much of its responsibility to the UN.

Three days after Nargis struck Myanmar, the then-ASEAN Secretary-General appealed to all member states "to provide urgent relief assistance through the framework of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Relief [AADMER]."⁵¹ Unlike 2005, however, when ASEAN leaders made similar promises and appeals just a week after the earthquake and tsunami, this speech was actually followed by concrete action. Over the next few months, the Secretary-General led an effort that "won the respect of many in the international community," doing whatever he could through existing protocols such as AADMER, as well as through the creation of several ad hoc organizations to facilitate the flow of aid to Myanmar.⁵²

Within a week, ASEAN had already dispatched an 'Emergency Rapid Assessment Team,' met with leaders of relevant international organizations like the World Bank or IMF to organize aid packages for Myanmar *and* summoned a Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Singapore. First (and foremost in terms of importance), that meeting accomplished the difficult goal of reaching an agreement with representatives from Naypyidaw whereby "Myanmar will accept international assistance."⁵³ Additionally, it created a new, ASEAN-led organization, the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) to "provide policy decisions and establish the priorities and targets with regard to the implementation of this ASEAN-led initiative."⁵⁴ The AHTF, in turn, created the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) located in Yangon, which would operate on the ground in Myanmar and be comprised of representatives from ASEAN, the government of Myanmar, and the United Nations. Whereas the AHTF would serve as "a diplomatic body," the TCG would coordinate and "facilitate day-to-day operations."⁵⁵ In other words, the AHTF would set overall goals for relief efforts, coordinating with international bodies like the World Bank or Red Cross, while the TCG would focus on achieving the priorities of the AHTF, for example, ensuring that visas and transportation could be acquired for aid workers.⁵⁶

The events that followed the creation of the AHTF and the TCG in May 2008 were substantial relief efforts for Myanmar, and due to that, indications of success for ASEAN on the issue of disaster management cooperation. Not only did all

member states pledge some amount of monetary aid (such as Cambodia's contribution of USD \$50,000 or Singapore's donation of USD \$200,000) as well as non-financial assistance, but the AHTF and TCG continued to meet throughout the recovery effort in order to adapt to Myanmar's short-term, intermediate, and long-term needs.⁵⁷ The TCG even drafted the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA), a "massive multi-stakeholder joint assessment effort involving the Myanmar government, ASEAN, the UN, international financial institutions and INGOs [International Non-governmental Organizations]."⁵⁸ What the PONJA accomplished was the quantification of Myanmar's needs by estimating as precisely as possible the toll of Cyclone Nargis and the cost of recovery efforts. The statistics from PONJA were used to guide ASEAN's Pledging Conference for Myanmar in late May, and enabled that conference to succeed in eliciting donations from the international community.⁵⁹

What the Nargis relief efforts, spearheaded by ASEAN, should demonstrate is how, the organization was able to, in the words of its Secretary-General, "bring the world to Myanmar in spite of everything."⁶⁰ Without ASEAN, there probably would have been no international relief effort, let alone one as monumental as that staged by the AHTF and the TCG. The institution managed to open one of the most isolated and vilified regimes on the planet to over USD \$300 million in monetary aid as well to hundreds of foreign aid workers. While other nations and groups attempted to provide aid, it was only "following... the organization of a relief effort coordinated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that supplies began to flow more freely and foreign aid workers were allowed greater access."⁶¹ Leaders of the government of Myanmar themselves even praised the ASEAN response to Cyclone Nargis. For instance, Myanmar's Deputy Foreign Minister said that "ASEAN has played a critical role in providing a political umbrella under an ASEAN-led mechanism as well as in the success of [the] Tripartite Core Group."⁶² Based on this feedback, as well as the obvious contrasts between 2008 and 2005, one can conclude that ASEAN had certainly improved its disaster policy, and achieved a considerable degree of success in this field. As explained above, ASEAN became a largely effective apparatus through which the rest of the world could funnel vital supplies and other donations. Nargis "presented an opportunity to ASEAN" to make progress in cooperation on disaster relief.⁶³ And it was one opportunity that the organization certainly capitalized upon.

These types of achievements have only continued in the time since. As the Special Envoy for the ASEAN Secretary-General to post-Nargis recovery in Myanmar stated, the lesson learned was that "donors will come if you have a very strong structure."⁶⁴ Because of the effective organizations that ASEAN had created to help Myanmar, its efforts were hailed as a success. Thus, the reforms and additions since 2008 have all dealt with increasing the power and expanding the role of disaster management organs within ASEAN.

Most significantly, on September 14, 2009, the Philippines' Senate approved the AADMER. Although the AADMER had been in existence since 2005, it was not until the end of 2009, ten weeks after ratification by Manila, that the agreement became legally-binding. What followed the final passage of the AADMER was the creation of a new Work Programme for 2010 to 2015, one that would replace the ARPD and "substantially reduce loss of life and damage to economic, social, physical and environmental assets of ASEAN member states."⁶⁵ The AADMER set up a regional system of early warning and monitoring, improved national plans for disaster risk reduction, and further increased cooperation to achieve "a more effective and timely relief and response strategy."⁶⁶ Additionally, it called for the creation of the ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief Fund, the first such instance in ASEAN history of direct revenue explicitly for the purpose of disaster relief.

The AADMER has served to coordinate and organize ASEAN's response to natural disasters unlike any pact between its members in the past. Not only did the AADMER establish working groups under the ACDM devoted to preparedness, risk assessment, prevention and recovery, but it equipped ASEAN with an operational arm, the AHA, that had its own source of revenue.⁶⁷ This gave the organization much more power to provide substantial assistance to nations suffering from natural disasters. In the time since the passage of AADMER, ASEAN has demonstrated these strengthened abilities. Fortunately, there have not been any disasters as severe as Cyclone Nargis or the Boxing Day Earthquake and Tsunami to truly test the strength of ASEAN's response mechanisms, but, in cases of minor hurricanes and earthquakes, it is evident that ASEAN is better equipped now. For example, when an earthquake that measured 8.6 on the Richter scale struck off the coast of Indonesia in April 2012, "all tsunami-detecting devices in the Indian Ocean worked well and all capitals were on alert," and ASEAN's ability to signal leaders to get locals to higher ground in time through the early warning systems envisioned by AADMER elicited "praise for their effectiveness."⁶⁸ What AADMER, as well as the discussion of the Nargis response mentioned earlier in this section, is representative of is a much more empowered structural and organizational framework that has been put in place in the years since the Boxing Day Tsunami which ASEAN can now use to address natural disasters. Successes have been evident in Myanmar and many other smaller instances. Because of this, instead of the criticism and lamentation on disaster relief that ASEAN received for much of its history, scholars now make conclusions such as "ASEAN rose to the challenge," or ASEAN "took a bold step by proactively assuming a leadership role," which is nothing less than a drastic change in tone.⁶⁹ The story of the past five years verify that these claims are grounded in reality, and, hopefully for the member states of ASEAN, are only the beginning of a greater pattern of effective response to natural calamities.

5. Conclusion: Despite Massive Gains, a Work in Progress

In conclusion, ASEAN's disaster management apparatus has entered the second decade of the 21st century as a good example of a "new model of humanitarian partnership."⁷⁰ It has pioneered a form of cooperation amongst its members balanced between the ASEAN principle of non-interference and the authority required for a viable disaster management framework. ASEAN learned from its mistakes in 2005 following the Boxing Day earthquake and tsunami, and applied those lessons to the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and to the development of ASEAN's most ambitious plan yet, the AADMER. Yet, the association's policies are by no means perfect, and there remain several issues that ASEAN must address in order to avoid difficulty during future natural disasters, the severity and frequency of which will increase if current ecological trends continue. Accordingly, this paper provides three specific recommendations for policy improvements based upon the problems highlighted in the preceding four sections that ASEAN experienced while responding to natural disasters in the past. The following is certainly not an exhaustive list, but offers a strong starting point for the organization, if heeded, precisely because it focuses on issues that have often appeared when ASEAN dealt with significant natural disasters in the past. First, certain member states must do away with their reluctance about accepting aid, both from inside and outside of ASEAN. While aid may go against the "norm of non-interference, which is universally regarded as the centre-piece of the so-called 'ASEAN Way' of regionalism," refusing such aid only serves to magnify damage and hinder the atmosphere of cooperation the AADMER is trying to establish.⁷¹ The poster child of this habit is the government of Myanmar, which refused aid entirely after the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, stating that it "was able to cope with the catastrophe by itself," and only accepted help *with conditions* after Cyclone Nargis due to the pestering by the ASEAN Secretariat.⁷² However, Myanmar is not alone. Another, more recent, example is the Kingdom of Thailand. In 2011, Thailand refused to ask for international help following flooding in Northern and Central Thailand, which meant "difficulties in providing assistance" to the areas devastated by the floods.⁷³ If ASEAN's own members continue this kind of stubbornness, the organization will only be able to go so far in creating a disaster response mechanism. Member states need to realize that it is not only acceptable, but beneficial, to receive aid from ASEAN and other international sources. Nations that have opened up to ASEAN and international assistance, such as Vietnam and Cambodia in 2011 and 2012, have been able to recover quickly, and return to normalcy faster than those that do not. Furthermore, due to the "increasing trend in natural calamities," ASEAN members cannot afford to refuse foreign aid.⁷⁴

Second, ASEAN must continue to adapt to the specific kinds of needs its member states require during recovery. A good first step was taken with PONJA during the Nargis recovery, which carefully analyzed the situation on the ground and pro-

vided for specific recommendations in terms of monetary as well as tangible aid. Presently, the missing factor often discussed by scholars of the region is the availability of ASEAN-sponsored Urban Search and Rescue teams that can be deployed quickly and effectively to nations impacted by disaster. As of 2012, "only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore maintain official USAR agencies," which are insufficient for the region given the frequency of earthquakes and typhoons in Southeast Asia.⁷⁵ ASEAN would be wise to establish similar programs for all members under the AADMER to facilitate immediate training and institute a program that would increase self-reliance within ASEAN in times of natural disasters.

Third, ASEAN member states need to continue to strengthen the structures and policies set in place by the AADMER, as well as to increase their own willingness to contribute to the recovery efforts in the aftermath of natural disasters. As discussed earlier, the two main reasons why the response to Cyclone Nargis was thought to be successful were structures like the AHTF and the TCG, and Myanmar's willingness to open up to an ASEAN-led recovery effort. Current trends in disaster management seem to be following this pattern, as the AADMER not only constituted a binding agreement, but allowed for the creation of "a fund... for the implementation of" AADMER.⁷⁶ However, if ASEAN truly wants to improve its disaster management capabilities, it should make contributions to the AADMER fund mandatory. Just as the creation of the Fund for ASEAN in 1969 added to the power and legitimacy of the region organization by requiring that "[e]ach member country shall initially contribute to the Fund an amount equivalent to USD \$1 million," a mandatory donation by each member state to the AADMER fund would expand the scale and scope of ASEAN's natural disaster relief operations, saving it from reliance upon reluctant national governments or the international community.⁷⁷ At the very least, it would mean an end to the frequent scholarly verdicts along the lines of "ASEAN's disaster management remains questionable due to a secretariat that is financially challenged."⁷⁸

Yet, despite these areas for improvement, much can be applauded about ASEAN's current programs for disaster management, certainly when compared to the rudimentary framework of the 20th century. Sub-organizations have been created, strengthened, and tested, improving and adapting with each new disaster. ASEAN is moving in the right direction, and a strategy is falling into place more apt to take on whatever natural disaster may occur next.

References

1. D. Guha-Sapir, D. Hargitt and P. Hoyois, *Thirty Years of Natural Disasters 1974-2003: The Numbers* (Presses Univ. de Louvain, Louvain, Brussels, 2004), p. 13.
2. P. Pujino, ACDM Support to the Institutionalization of Community-Based Disaster Risk Management, Paper prepared for the Third Disaster Management Practitioners' Workshop for Southeast Asia Bangkok, Thailand (10-13 May 2004); Dr. Pujino formerly served as a technical "expert" with ASEAN's Experts Group on Natural Disasters, representing the Republic of Indonesia.

3. Ibid.
4. ASEAN Secretariat, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Indonesia, 24 February 1974 (24 February 1974) [Online]. Available: <http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm> [Accessed 14 November 2012].
5. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters, Manila, 26 June 1976 (26 June 1976) [Online]. Available: <http://www.aseansec.org/17455.htm> [Accessed 14 November 2012].
6. Ibid.
7. The Associated Press, Rains slow quake-area relief work, *The Baltimore Sun* (21 August 1976).
8. The Associated Press, Senate Endorses Philippines Relief, *The Washington Post* (24 August 1976); L. Noble, Philippines 1976: The Contrast between Shrine and Shanty, *Asian Survey* 17, 139 (February 1977). Despite the fact that the Non-Aligned Movement included several ASEAN member states, it should be noted that it was not ASEAN, but the NAM that contributed to the aid effort.
9. Pujino.
10. ASEAN Secretariat, Overview (2012) [Online]. Available: <http://www.aseansec.org/9606.htm> [Accessed 14 November 2012].
11. R. Palmer and T. Reckford, *Building ASEAN: 20 Years of Southeast Asian Cooperation* (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 1987), p. 9.
12. ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters, Manila, 26 June 1976.
13. United States Geological Survey, Historic World Earthquakes (2012) [Online]. Available: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/historical_country.php#indonesia [Accessed 14 November 2012].
14. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Indonesia Earthquake Dec 1992 UN DHA Situation Reports 1 – 9 (12 December 1992) [Online]. Available: <http://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/indonesia-earthquake-dec-1992-un-dha-situation-reports-1-9> [Accessed 14 November 2012].
15. United Nations Development Programme, Summing-up report on disaster situations in recent years and preparedness and mitigation measures in Vietnam (24 February 2003) [Online]. Available: <http://reliefweb.int/report/viet-nam/summing-report-disaster-situations-recent-years-and-preparedness-and-mitigation> [Accessed 14 November 2012].
16. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Vietnam Typhoon Linda Situation Report No. 4 (14 November 1997) [Online]. Available: <http://reliefweb.int/report/viet-nam/vietnam-typhoon-linda-situation-report-no4> [Accessed 14 November 2012].
17. M. Rolls, "Centrality and Continuity: ASEAN and Regional Security since 1967," *East Asia: An International Quarterly* 29, 127-139 (September 2011).
18. Pujino.; I. Caballero-Anthony, Regional Support for Southeast Asia Disaster Preparedness, *NTS Alert* 2, 5 (2009).
19. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management (2010) [Online]. Available: <http://www.aseansec.org/18444.htm> [Accessed 15 November 2012].
20. R. Prasiddha, ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management, Paper presented at the International Conference on Environment and Disaster Management, Melaka, Malaysia (25-29 August, 2005)
21. A. Julio, *ASEAN and Disaster Management in the New Century: Response and Implications of the 2004 Indian Ocean Disaster* (Tamkang University Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Taiwan, 2011).

22. Ibid, p. 6.
23. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management.
24. Prasiddha, p. 2.
25. BBC News, Indonesia quake toll jumps again (25 January 2010) [Online]. Available: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4204385.stm> [Accessed 17 November 2012]; C. Sinadinovski, The Event of 26th of December 2004 – The Biggest Earthquake in the World in the Last 40 Years, *Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering* 4, pp. 131–139 (May 2006).
26. U.S. Geological Survey, Magnitude 9.1 – OFF THE COAST OF NORTHERN SUMATRA (2012) [Online]. Available: <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2004/us2004slav/#details> [Accessed 17 November 2012]; Natural Disasters: Counting the Cost (21 May 2011) [Online]. Available: http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/03/natural_disasters [Accessed 17 November 2012]; S. Jayasuriya and P. McCawley, “Reconstruction after a Major Disaster: Lessons from the Post-Tsunami Experience in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand,” ADBI Working Paper No. 125, 6(Asian Development Bank Institute, Japan, 2008).
27. R. Wang and J. Bean, Asia’s Response to Climate Change and Natural Disasters: Implications for an Evolving Regional Architecture: A Report of the CSIS Asian Regionalism Initiative (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2010).
28. ASEAN, Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004 (6 January 2005) [Online]. Available: <http://www2.adb.org/Documents/Papers/Tsunami/asean-earthquake-tsunami.pdf> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
29. H.Gentner, ASEAN: Cooperative disaster relief after the tsunami, *J. of Current SE Asian Affairs* 24, 4 (2005).
30. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, Malaysia’s Anwar criticizes ASEAN, OIC disaster response (10 January 2005) [Online]. Available: <http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/pqrl/docview/460689650/139D625976346794F2/7?accountid=11091> [Accessed November 17, 2012].
31. Julio, 10.; ASEAN Secretariat, Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004.
32. P. Karan and S.Subbiah, *The Indian Ocean Tsunami: The Global Response to a Natural Disaster* (University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2011), p. 25.; Financial Tracking Service, INDIAN OCEAN – Earthquake/Tsunami – December 2004 (19 November 2012) [Online]. Available: http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10_E14794_asof_1211191210.pdf [Accessed 19 November 2012].
33. Ibid; ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management.
34. Financial Tracking Service.
35. K.Ong, Leadership After Tsunami,’ Remarks Delivered by H.E. Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of ASEAN at the Asia Leadership Conference 2005 Seoul, 3 March 2005 (2005) [Online]. Available: <http://www.aseansec.org/17302.htm> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
36. Indian Ocean Tsunami and International Cooperation, in *East Asian Strategic Review 2006*, ed.The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS Press, Tokyo, 2006), p. 51.
37. Agence France-Presse, South Asia Tsunami: ASEAN says drill shows need for better emergency response coordination (21 September 2005) [Online]. Available <http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/south-asia-tsunami-asean-says-drill-shows-need-better-emergency-response-coordination> [Accessed 21 November 2012].

38. ASEAN Secretariat, Calendar of ASEAN Meetings on Disaster Management 2006 (2006) [Online]. Available www.aseansec.org/18449.htm+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [Accessed 21 November 2012]; Xinhua, ASEAN disaster relief exercise ends in Indonesia (15 July 2011) [Online]. Available: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/7442039.html> [Accessed November 21, 2012].
39. Ibid.
40. ASEAN, ARF and ASEAN Cooperation in Disaster Management (2012) [Online]. Available: <http://www.aseansec.org/ARF/13ARF/WS-Civil-Military/Doc-16.pdf> [Accessed November 21, 2012].; Julio, p. 10.
41. ASEAN, Press Release: ASEAN Disaster Management Agreement to Enter Into Force by the End of 2009 (16 September 2009) <http://www.aseansec.org/PR-AADMER-EIF-End-2009.pdf> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
42. ASEAN, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Vientiane, 26 July 2005 (26 July 2005) [Online]. Available: <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-vientiane-26-july-2005-4> [Accessed 21 November 2012]; J. Amador III, Community Building at the Time of Nargis: The ASEAN Response, *J. of Current SE Asian Affairs* 28, 16 (2008).
43. S.K. Jayasuriya and P. McCawley, *The Asian Tsunami: Aid and Reconstruction After a Disaster* (Asian Development Bank Institute and Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2010), p. 233.
44. M. Flint and H. Goyder, *Funding the Tsunami Response: A Synthesis of Initial Findings*, (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, London, 2006), p. 15.
45. Julio, 12; A bridge to recovery: "ASEAN's response to Cyclone Nargis (20 July 2009) [Online]. Available: <http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/bridge-recovery-aseans-response-cyclone-nargis> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
46. N. Morada, ASEAN and the ARF, in *The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect* (The Stanley Foundation, New York, 2011), p. 24.
47. Action Against Hunger, Worldwide missions: Burma (2012) [Online]. Available: <http://www.actionagainsthunger.org.uk/what-we-do/where-we-work-hidden/burma-myanmar/> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
48. ASEAN, A HUMANITARIAN CALL – THE ASEAN Response to Cyclone Nargis (26 August 2010) [Online]. Available: <http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/humanitarian-call-asean-response-cyclone-nargis> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
49. J. Everett, Failures in Myanmar Post-Cyclone Nargis (24 October 2008) [Online]. Available: <http://voices.yahoo.com/failures-myanmar-post-cyclone-nargis-2067764.html> [Accessed 21 November 2012]; S. McCarthy, "Burma and ASEAN: Estranged Bedfellows," *Asian Survey* 48:6, 931 (November/December 2008).
50. S. Marr, *Compassion in Action: The Story of ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar* (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta 2010), p. 25
51. Y. Creach and L. Fan, ASEAN's role in the Cyclone Nargis response: implications, lessons and opportunities (December 2008) [Online]. Available: <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-41/aseans-role-in-the-cyclone-nargis-response-implications-lessons-and-opportunities> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
52. K. Baldwin, ASEAN finds new purpose with Cyclone Nargis response (1 May 2009) [Online]. Available: <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/asean-finds-new-purpose-with-cyclone-nargis-response/> [Accessed 21 November 2012].

53. ASEAN, Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting Chairman's Statement (19 May 2008) [Online]. Available: www.aseansec.org/21556.htm [Accessed 21 November 2012].
54. Marr, p. 41.
55. Creach.
56. *A Bridge to Recovery: ASEAN's Response to Cyclone Nargis* (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), 11.
57. Xinhua, Cambodia donates \$50,000 to cyclone-hit Myanmar (7 May 2008) [Online]. Available: <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/6405781.html> [Accessed 21 November 2012]; M. Wong, Singapore sends off first batch of relief supplies to Myanmar (7 May 2008) [Online]. Available: <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/346201/1/.html> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
58. Creach.
59. K. Ban, Address to the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference, (26 May 2008) [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/search_full.asp?statID=249 [Accessed 21 November 2012].
60. Marr, p. 72.
61. A. Selth, Even Paranooids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's Fears of Invasion, *ContempSE Asia* 30, 388-389 (2008).
62. T. Kiang, ASEAN gets praise for Nargis role (January-February 2009) [Online]. Available: <http://www.mmtimes.com/no455/n003.htm> [21 November 2012].
63. McCarthy, Burma and ASEAN: Estranged Bedfellows, 932.
64. Baldwin, ASEAN finds new purpose with Cyclone Nargis response.
65. M. Reyes, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) Work Programme 2010-2015 (26 March 2010) [Online]. Available: www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/ASEAN_AADMER_2010_IAP_work_prgmm.pdf [Accessed 21 November 2012].
66. The Implementation of a Disaster Management Agreement in ASEAN: Towards Regional Preparedness? *NTS Alert* 2, 3 (2010).
67. Reyes, p. 22.
68. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Indonesia: Early warning pays off after tsunami threat, (1 May 2012) [Online]. Available: <http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/indonesia-early-warning-pays-after-tsunami-threat> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
69. W. Sabandar, Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar, in *Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections*, eds. N. Cheesman, M. Skidmore and T. Wilson (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010), p. 198; Ibid, p. 200.
70. Creach.
71. L. Jones, *ASEAN and the Norm of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia*, Paper prepared for the Nuttfield College Politics Group (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2009).
72. Genter, p. 6.
73. P. Yuthamanop, Flood aid refusal 'was self defeating' (29 April 2012) [Online]. Available: <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/investigation/290961/british-ambassador-says-government-refusal-to-accept-help-hindered-foreign-aid-efforts> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
74. The European Union, Humanitarian Implementation Plan: Southeast Asia (3 March 2012) [Online]. Available: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2012/HIPs/south_east.asia.pdf [Accessed 21 November 2012].

75. H. Han, *Evolving Role of ASEAN in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters*, (25 May 2011) [Online]. Available: http://www.strategyinternational.org/index.php/en/sectors/defence-analysisdecision-making/defence-analysis/142-evolving-role-of-asean-in-the-aftermath-of-natural-disasters#_ftn5 [Accessed 21 November 2012].
76. ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response* Vientiane, 26 July 2005.
77. ASEAN Secretariat, *Agreement for the Establishment of a Fund for ASEAN Rules Governing the Control, Disbursement and Accounting of the Fund for the ASEAN Cameron Highlands*, 17 December 1969 (December 17, 1969) [Online]. Available: <http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-secretariat/basic-documents/item/asean-secretariat-basic-documents-agreement-for-the-establishment-of-a-fund-for-asean-rules-governing-the-control-disbursement-and-accounting-of-the-fund-for-asean-cameron-highlands-17-december-1969-2> [Accessed 21 November 2012].
78. J. Amador III, *ASEAN in the Asia Pacific: Central or Peripheral?*, *Asian Politics & Policy* 2:4, 601–616 (October/December 2010).